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RECENT CASE NOTES
through no fault of his, compliance was impossible? The restriction would
surely be valid in a case where the defendant could have complied, for it
would naturally prevent abuses of the privilege and expedite justice with-
out substantial injury to an innocent defendant. It might be argued that
to make the rule effective it would be necessary to apply it in all cases,
and that the social interest behind the condition would therefore be strong
enough to justify its application even where compliance would be impossi-
ble. However, while the question is undeniably close, it is submitted that
in such a case the social interests in favor of the privilege are stronger,
and that the condition so applied is unconstitutional, assuming that the
privilege to which it is attached is guaranteed by the Constitution.
It is submitted, then, that the language of the court was too broad
when it said that since this was a privilege which could not be entirely
withheld, it could be granted upon any condition; that the result reached
was correct unless there was error in holding that there is no non-statutory
privilege to a change from the judge for bias and prejudice; that this latter
position is supported by the great weight of authority, but that the other
result logically ought to be reached; and that if it were reached, the condi-
tion attached to its exercise by the Indiana statute, as applied in this case,
would be unconstitutional. W.H.H.
CONDITIONAL SALES-RIGHTS OF PARTIEs ON DEFAULT.-On May 29,
1929, appellant and appellees entered a conditional sales contract for the
purchase by the appellant from the appellees of a refrigerator. According
to this contract the purchase price was to be paid in monthly installments of
$19.78 with six per cent interest on each installment after its maturity.
The title was to remain in the appellees until the purchase price had been
fully paid. The contract further provided that on default by the appel-
lant in any installment the appellees might at their option take possession
of the refrigerator and any sums previously paid would be considered pay-
ment for the use of the property including its depreciation. On Novem-
ber 26, 1929, after appellant had defaulted in the payments, appellees exer-
cised their option and repossessed the property. The husband of the appel-
lant testified that in a talk with appellees on May 16, 1930, it was agreed
that appellees were to redeliver the refrigerator on payment of $78.66 by
the appellant; that this was paid on that day but appellees refused to rede-
liver until all payments in arrears had been made. Suit was brought by
appellant for money had and received by appellees for appellant's use and
benefit. From a judgment of the trial court for the appellees, this appeal
was taken. Held, affirmed.l
Appellant defaulted in the payments under the written conditional sales
contract entered into on May 29, 1929. There is some conflict in the
authorities as to the rights of the parties to a conditional sales contract
when the conditional buyer defaults and the seller repossesses the prop-
erty. It is the rule in some jurisdictions that the buyer may recover any
amounts paid under the contract.2 In other jurisdictions the amount paid
'Schwab v. Schmall, Appellate Court of Indiana (1932), 183 N. E. 328.
2 lnternational Harvester Co. v. Lockwood (1932), (Ind. App.), 179 N. E. 736;
Hill v. Townsend (1881) 69 Ala. 286; Miller v. Steen (1S66), 30 Cal. 402, 89 Am.
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by the buyer is forfeited.3 Although both of these views are subject to
criticism, the latter would appear to be the better view. In Pfeiffer V.
Norman 4 the court said: "The question then arises whether, on the termi-
nation of such a contract, caused by the default of the vendee, the vendee
may recover the partial payments made thereon. A few states seem to
hold that he can do so, but it is not clear as to what extent their deci-
sions are governed by statute. In this state there is no statute specifically
covering such case. In any event, it seems clear that the great weight of
authority, as well as of reason, is to the effect that in an action at law the
vendee cannot recover such payments where he is the party in default. To
hold that he might do so would lead to startling results." As is said by
one authority, it would be offering a bounty for the violation of contracts.
The Uniform Conditional Sales Act attempts to diminish the hardships
that might result under either of these two rules and provides for repos-
session by the seller,5 but protects the defaulting buyer by compelling the
seller to comply with certain other provisions.6 Indiana has not adopted
this act and no statute governs the situation as do statutes in some states.
There is no doubt that in Indiana the seller may repossess the property.'
The rule has been stated: "It is a settled rule of law that if personal
property is sold, title to remain in the seller until the purchase is fully
paid, and there is default on the part of the purchaser in making the
payment as agreed, the seller may elect to retake the property as owner
thereof, or he may treat the sale as absolute and sue for the price."8 The
law in Indiana as to the right of the buyer to recover -the amount paid in
a situation where the seller elects to repossess the property appears to
follow the rule submitted above as the minority view. It has been said:
"But in Indiana it is a condition precedent to retaking that the seller
return to the buyer whatever part payments he has made less damages
done to the goods and the value of the use of the same, unless there is a
provision in the contract of sale providing for a forfeiture of part pay-
ments. This is upon the theory that the seller is retaking the goods for
his own use and is rescinding the contract."9 In as much as the contract
in the instant case contained a provision denying appellant the right to
recover any amount paid, there is no basis for the contention that appel-
Dec. 124; Hamilton v. Singer (1870) 54 11. 370; Preston v. Whitney (1871), 23
Mich. 260; Quality Clothes Shop v. Reeney (1914) 57 Ind. App. 500, 106 N. E. 541.
sEiler's Music House v. Oriental Co. (1912), 69 Wash. 618, 125 Pac. 1023;
Fields v. Williams (1891), 91 Ala. 502, 8 So. 808; Hughes v. Keely (1873), 40
Conn. 148; Fleck v. Warner (1881) 25 Kans. 342; White v. Oakes (1896), 88 Me.
367, 34 AttL 175; Lorain Steel Co. v. Norfolk, etc. Ry. Co. (1905), 187 Mass. 500,
73 N. E1. 646; Duke v. Shakelford (1879) 56 Miss. 552.
' (1911) 22 N. D. 168, 133 N. W. 97 at 99.
OUniform Conditional Sales Act, Section 16.
6Uniform Conditional Sales Act, Sections 18, 23, 25.
7 Quality Clothes Shop v. Zeeny (1914), 57 Ind. App. 500, 106 N. R. 41; Reeves vi.
Miller (1910), 48 Ind. App. 339, 91 N. E. 812; Randall v. Chaney (1926), 84 Ind.
App. 280, 151 N. D. 105; Peoples State Bank of Ind. v. Hall (1925), 83 Ind. App.
385, 148 N. E. 486; Green v. Sinker, Davis & Co. (1893), 135 Ind. 434, 35 N. E. 262.
gRandall 'v. Cahney (1926), 84 Ind. App. 280, 151 N. E. 105, citing Smith v.
Barber (1899), 153 Ind. 322, 53 N. E. 1014 and cases cited.
9 (1926) I Ind. L. J. 194 at 199.
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lant should recover the amount paid by her under the original contrac
unless the subsequent oral agreement alters the situation.
There are no facts set out in this case that would bring the contract in
controversy within the terms of 1926 Burns' 8049 requiring the contract
to be in writing and therefore the written contract could very well be
modified by the subsequent oral agreement.'* But, as was pointed out in
Pfeiffer v. Normnan," this would not entitle the defaulting buyer to re-
cover the amount paid under the original contract, and no question is pre-
sented as to payments under the contract as modified for no payments
were made under it. J. S. H.
JURISDICTION OVER A FOREIGN CORPORATION-CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITA-
TIONS ON ExuacIsE OF JUwIsDIcrmN.-.The plaintiff, a foreign corporation,
which had not complied with the statutes permitting it to do business
within this state, brought an action in the Delaware Superior Court upon
six notes of five hundred dollars each which were executed in Missouri
and payable in Massachusetts. The defendant was a foreign corporation
engaged in the traveling show business, and it had not complied with the
statutes permitting it to do business within this state, but at the time
this action was commenced it was giving exhibitions in Muncie, Indiana.
The general manager of the defendant corporation was served with pro-
cess and the defendant corporation's property was attached. The de-
fendant filed a plea in abatement questioning the jurisdiction of the court,
and from a decree abating the action the plaintiff appealed. Held, that
the court did have jurisdiction quasi in rem by attachment of the defend-
ant's tangible property within the jurisdiction of the court.'
This is the first time that either the Supreme or the Appellate Court of
this state has been called upon to pass upon this identical question, and it
seems that this question has not yet been settled by the Supreme Court
of the United States.2
In the opinion the court used the word jurisdiction in three different
ways: first, general jurisdiction in the international sense meaning the
power of the state to create rights which under the common law will be
recognized as valid in other states;3 second, jurisdiction over the defend-
ant meaning the power to render a valid personal judgment against the
defendant; and third, jurisdiction in T'em meaning the power to create a
valid judgment to the extent of property attached under the statute.4 It
is important and much confusion may be avoided if the meaning of the
word jurisdiction, as used at a particular time, is kept in mind.
1ORobinson v. Harner (1911), 176 Ind. 226, 95 N. E. 561; Guthrie v. Carpenter
(1904), 162 Ind. 417, 70 N. E1. 486; Loomis v. Donovan (1861) 17 Ind. 198; Rigsbee
'v. Bowder (1861), 17 Ind. 167; Bilingsley v. Stratton (1858) 11 Ind. 396; Rhodes
v. Thomas (1851), 2 Ind. 638.
U (1911) 22 N. D. 168, 133 N. W. 97.
1 Dodgem Corp 'v. D. D. Murphy Shows Inc., App. Court of Ind., December 23,
1932, 183 N. E. 699.
2 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, proposed
final draft No. 1, See. 97, special note P. 135.
3 Supra, Sec. 43.
tBurns' Ann. St. 1926, See. 981.
